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Abstract
This paper proposes a new framework of choice under uncertainty,
where the only information available to the decision maker is about the
the ordinal likelihood of the dierent outcomes each action generates.
This contrasts both with the classical models where the potential out-
comes of each action have an associated probability distribution, and
with the more recent complete uncertainty models, where the agent
has no information whatever about the probability of the outcomes,
even of an ordinal nature. We present an impossibility result in our
framework, and some ways to circumvent it that result in dierent
ranking rules.
Keywords: Uncertainty, Ordinal Likelihood, Nonprobabilistic models,
Complete Uncertainty
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1 Introduction
In the conventional models of individual choice, when the outcomes of the al-
ternatives are uncertain, they are assumed to be equipped with a probability
distribution. There are, however, many decision problems in which it is hard
to assume objective probabilities. Savage [22] provided a well-known solution
to this problem by showing that, under certain conditions, individuals assign
to the possible uncertain events probabilities of a subjective nature, which
they then use to maximize the expected utility of the alternatives.
The assumption of the existence of a standard subjective probability mea-
surement can, in many instances, be considered too strong a requirement,
however. There are in fact some models in which the Ellsberg Paradox is
explained by relaxing such requirement. One such model is that of Gilboa
and Schmeidler [15] who explain it by relaxing the assumption of a unique
subjective probability. Another is that of Schmeidler [23] who does so by
assuming that it is not additive. From a technical point of view, a pow-
erful reason for not considering conventional probabilities is that, for such
probabilities to exist, Savage's [22] requirements, which are nontrivial, must
necessarily be fullled (see also de Finetti [13], Kraft et al. [18], and Scott
[24]).
The non-existence of a probability distribution for the outcomes of the
alternatives has been approached, in a more radical way, under the so-called
models of choice under \complete uncertainty". There, it is assumed that
the decision maker has no information about the probabilities of the possible
outcomes or about their relative likelihood. We nd two approaches within
the models of choice under complete uncertainty:
 The vector-based approach takes into account the set of possible states
of nature and the corresponding outcomes of each alternative action
under each state. Formally, therefore, an action (or alternative) is
described by a function that assigns an outcome to each possible state.
In other words, an action is a vector of outcomes contingent upon the
possible states of nature. It is therefore assumed that the agent has no
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information about the probabilities or relative likelihood of the dierent
states of nature. Examples of this approach are to be found in Arrow
and Hurwicz [3], Maskin [19], Cohen and Jaray [12], Barbera and
Jackson [6], and Barret and Pattanaik [8].
 The set-based approach does not take into account any information
about the possible states of nature. It simply considers the possible
outcomes of each action. Therefore, each action is described, simply,
by the set of outcomes it may generate (see, for example, Barbera et
al. [4], Barbera and Pattanaik [7], Kannai and Peleg [16], Nitzan and
Pattanaik [20], Pattanaik and Peleg [21], Bossert [9, 10], Bossert et al.
[11] and Arlegi [1, 2]. For a survey, see Barbera et al. [5]). In these
models the decision maker is assumed to lack information about the
probabilities or relative likelihood of the outcomes directly. Thus, we
can interpret that complete uncertainty under the set-based approach
is even stronger than in the vector-based approach, since the connection
between states of nature and outcomes is absent.
The authors that have developed the set-based approach invoke several
relative advantages over the vector-based formulation. One is that the for-
mer might be more suitable for the tractability of overly complex problems,
where it might be dicult to identify the particular states under which each
outcome occurs. Such identication is sometimes unnecessary or simply im-
possible, and then the decision maker considers only the possible outcomes
of each action. Secondly, in some situations the states of nature may be
arbitrarily partitioned in dierent ways, making the vector-based approach
dependent upon this arbitrariness. Finally, the set-based approach has been
defended as a more suitable way to represent the Rawlsian problem of choice
under the veil of ignorance (a deeper discussion of all these arguments can
be found in Pattanaik and Peleg [21] and Bossert et al. [11]).
One shortcoming that is present in both approaches is that, from a de-
scriptive point of view, the information on which they are based might be
considered too vague. In general, human beings have some perception as to
which states are more and less likely. Taking this idea, Kelsey [17] proposes a
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model in which the decision maker is unable to assign numerical probabilities
to the possible states of nature, but knows which states are more and which
are less likely. Thus, Kelsey's [17] model can be viewed as being midway
between subjective expected utility and the vector-based models of choice
under complete uncertainty.
We share Kelsey's [17] view that, in many contexts, individuals are un-
able to establish subjective probability distributions, and that the kind of
comparisons they make are of an ordinal nature. In our paper, however, we
apply this assumption to a set-based framework. That is, we do not take into
account any information about the states of nature. We represent actions
solely by means of the outcomes they might produce. In this way, the ordinal
perception of likelihood is directly about outcomes, rather than about states
of nature.1 In our framework, therefore, we take the information associated
to each individual action to have two components: the possible outcomes,
and an (ordinal) ranking over them, which is made in terms of likelihood.
The dierences with Kelsey's [17] modelling are in no way trivial. In
addition to incorporating the relative advantages of the set-based approach,
our model compares objects of a dierent nature (sets with possibly dierent
cardinalities rather than contingent functions). Our results therefore belong
to a dierent category.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the basic notation
and denitions. In Section 3 we present a rst result showing that there is no
preorder over the set of individual actions that at once satises three plausible
axioms. We propose two solutions to overcome this negative result. First,
in Section 4, we restrict the domain to rankings involving only individual
actions with the same cardinality (equal number of possible outcomes). We
then propose a new set of axioms for this case, renouncing one of the axioms of
the impossibility result. In Section 5 we extend these criteria to the general
domain, obtaining some rules that satisfy only two of the three axioms of
1We discovered Kelsey's article only after obtaining all our results, and the paper was
practically nished. Reading his work has sharpened our perspective both on the problem
and the scope of our contribution.
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the impossibility theorem. We conclude in Section 6 with some comments
concerning possible lines of further research within our general framework.
2 Notation and denitions
We dene X as an innite universal set of outcomes (or results), equipped
with a linear order R (complete, transitive and antisymmetric), which reects
the agent's preferences over them.2 The asymmetric factor, P , of R is dened
as usual. We will say that X is rich with respect to R if for all x; y 2 X such
that xPy, there exists a; b; c 2 X such that aPxPbPyPc. That is, in a
rich domain, for any two outcomes, there is always another that is better,
another that is worse, and another that is midway between the two. In
general, richness will not be assumed throughout the paper, except when
explicitly stated.
We assume that each individual action generates a set of possible out-
comes, and that the nal outcome is determined by a chance mechanism.
Further, we assume that, for every action, the decision maker is able to assign
a likelihood ranking over its possible outcomes. Given the above assumptions
concerning the nature of the alternative actions, we represent each action,
or alternative, by a certain non-empty nite ordered subset of X, where we
adopt the convention that the elements are ordered from more to less likely.
For example, ~a = (a1; : : : ; an) represents an individual action that might pro-
duce the mutually exclusive outcomes a1; : : : ; an (and no others), such that
the agent perceives outcome a1 to be more likely than outcome a2, the latter
more likely than outcome a3, and so on.
Formally, the dierence between the above representation of the actions,
and that used in the set-based approach to the choice under complete un-
certainty problem is that in the latter the actions are represented by bare
(non-ordered) sets, each representing the possible outcomes generated by a
certain action. For example, in that framework the set A = fa1; : : : ; ang
2The results of the paper can be easily adapted if we drop the antisymmetry require-
ment, introduced for the sake of uency.
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would represent an action under which the outcomes a1 to an are possible,
and, given that the choice under complete uncertainty framework makes no
assumption about the likelihood or probability of the outcomes, the order
of presentation is meaningless, and the same action could be represented by
any permutation of them. Obviously, in our framework, any permutation of
the elements within a set would represent a dierent action, since it would
modify the relative likelihood of the outcomes.
We assume feasibility of every combination of the outcomes and, there-
fore, we study rankings over all the possible non-empty ordered subsets of
X. We will denote the set of all the non-empty ordered subsets of X by Q,
and for k 2 N, Qk will be the set of all ordered subsets of X with cardinality
k, being Q = S1k=1Qk. Thus, our formal goal is to compare elements of Q by
means of a binary relation % in order to reect individual preferences over
alternative actions. We will say that % is a preorder if it satises reexivity
and transitivity, and that it is a complete preorder if it is both a preorder
and also satises completeness.
For all ~a 2 Q, all x 62 ~a and all m  (j~aj + 1), Im(~a; x) denotes the
ordered set (a1; : : : ; am 1; x; am; : : : ; ak). That is, Im(~a; x) denotes a new set
of outcomes where x has been inserted in the m-th position of ~a without
aecting the likelihood ordering of the remaining outcomes. We dene the
class of vectors I(~a; x) as: I(~a; x) = f~b 2 Qj~aj+1 j there exists m  (j~aj +
1) such that ~b = Im(~a; x)g. That is, I(~a; x) includes all the actions that can
be obtained by inserting x in any position of ~a.
(i;j)(~a) denotes a permutation of ~a where ai and aj are the only permuted
outcomes. That is, for ~a 2 Q, (i;j)(~a) = (a(1); : : : ; a(j~aj)), where  is a
permutation on f1; : : : ; j~ajg such that a(i) = aj, a(j) = ai, and a(l) = al
for all l 62 fi; jg.
For all ~a;~b 2 Q, we dene the non-ordered sets ~a[~b and ~a\~b as follows:
~a [~b = fx 2 X j x 2 ~a or x 2 ~bg and ~a \~b = fx 2 X j x 2 ~a and x 2 ~bg.
For all ~a;~b 2 Q such that ~a \ ~b = ;, we dene the ordered set (~a;~b) 2
Qj~aj+j~bj as follows: (~a;~b) = (a1; : : : ; aj~aj; b1; : : : ; bj~bj).
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Finally, for all nite C  X, maxfCg = fx 2 C j xPy for all y 2 Cg and
minfCg = fx 2 C j yPx for all y 2 Cg. With a slight abuse of notation,
we dene the max and min operators for the elements of Q in the same way.
That is, maxf~ag (minf~ag) represents the best (worst) outcome in ~a. Note
that, given the assumptions, for all ~a 2 Q, maxf~ag and minf~ag are always
singletons (the best and worst elements of any action are unique).
3 An impossibility result
Let us now consider the following axioms, which reect some ideas that are
intuitive to our framework.
Reordering (REO): For all ~a 2 Q and i < j,
ajPai ) (i;j)(~a)  ~a
REO refers to the following intuition: Assume that ai and aj are both
possible outcomes under a certain action ~a, and that aj is a better outcome
than ai, but is perceived as less likely by the agent. Then, if we consider
another action with the same set of possible outcomes, but where aj is per-
ceived as more likely than ai, without aecting the likelihood comparisons of
the remaining elements, the latter action is strictly better than the former.
Under REO, all sets with the same associated outcomes are no longer
indierent, which is in contrast with the set-based approach. REO in fact
shares the spirit of the Interchange axiom in Kelsey [17].
Dominance (DOM): For all ~a;~b;~c 2 Q and for all x; y 62 ~a such that
xPaiPy for all i 2 f1; : : : ; j~ajg, ~b 2 I(~a; x) and ~c 2 I(~a; y),
~b  ~a  ~c
DOM is a plausible extension of the Dominance axiom in the set-based
approach to choice under complete uncertainty. It is related to Gardenfors'
principle [14], introduced by Kannai and Peleg [16] and later widely used in
the related literature. The condition is very reasonable in our context also. In
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words, DOM states the following: assume that, at any position in the order
of likelihood, we add to an action ~a a new outcome that is better (worse)
than all the possible outcomes in ~a, without altering the ordinal likelihood
ordering of the original outcomes. Then, the nal situation is better (worse)
than the original one.
Composition (COM): For all ~a;~b;~c; ~d 2 Q such that ~a  ~b, ~c  ~d and
~a \ ~c = ~b \ ~d = ;,
(~a;~c) % (~b; ~d)
Consider two alternative actions ~a and ~c that are better than another two,
~b and ~d, respectively. Now consider an action that includes all the outcomes
in ~a and ~c, maintains the internal likelihood orders of both ~a and ~c, and
is such that any outcome in ~a is more likely than any outcome in ~c. Take
a similar composition of ~b and ~d. Condition COM establishes that such a
composition of ~b and ~d should not be strictly better than that of ~a and ~c.
In order to defend the plausibility of COM, imagine that ~a  ~b, but
~c and ~d are indierent. Then, it would be quite natural to assume that
(~a;~c)  (~b; ~d). In fact, this is the spirit of several very common conditions
of Independence in ranking sets models. COM is an even weaker condition,
in two senses: rst, we assume ~c to be strictly better than ~d, and second, we
admit (~a;~c) to be indierent to (~b; ~d).
Another argument in favor of COM arises if we imagine a natural adapta-
tion of this axiom to the choice under complete uncertainty framework under
the set-based approach. Such an adaptation would claim that the union of
two sets of outcomes, A and C, that are better than another two sets B
and D, respectively, should be better than the union of B and D. To the
best of our knowledge, all the rules proposed in the context of choice under
complete uncertainty would satisfy this axiom, with the exceptions of the
median rule by Pattanaik and Peleg [21] and certain rankings within the
family characterized by Bossert [10].
The main result for this section is the following:
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Theorem 3.1 There is no preorder % satisfying REO, DOM and COM.
[Proof in the Appendix ]
Two remarks are in order concerning Theorem 3.1. First, it can be proved
that the Theorem also applies for the case in which X is nite whenever
jXj  3. Secondly, completeness of % is not necessary for the impossibility
result, even in the case of a nite domain.
Our impression is that COM may be controversial in some instances and
that this in fact lies at the root of the impossibility result. In particular, this
happens when the actions to be compared are of very dierent cardinality
because a trade-o arises between the relative weight of adding certain out-
comes at the end of an action and the desirability of such outcomes. That
is, a slight dierence in the desirability of ~c and ~d might be compensated
by the small relative weight of the outcomes in ~c if the cardinality of ~a is
considerably greater than that of ~b. This motivates the direction of the rest
of the paper. In Section 4, we restrict our analysis to the case in which
the actions to be compared have the same cardinality, and in Section 5, we
study the general case renouncing the COM condition when the actions to
be compared are of dierent cardinality.
4 The equal cardinality case
We have already demonstrated the impossibility of combining axioms REO,
DOM and COM in order to rank, even partially, sets of outcomes with an
associated likelihood ranking. Therefore, in order to obtain some rules of
comparison, we need to renounce at least one of the three conditions. In
this dilemma, we do not consider the weakening or removal of REO, which
is a referential axiom for our framework, an acceptable option to resolve this
dilemma. In this section, we focus exclusively on comparisons of sets with
the same cardinality, which means that we will ignore DOM. This enables us
to overcome the impossibility result. Furthermore, we propose a new set of
axioms, all relating to the comparison of sets with the same cardinality (ac-
tions with the same number of associated outcomes). First, we present some
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axioms that are adaptations to our framework of conditions that appear in
the set-based approach to the problems of choice under complete uncertainty.
Extension (EXT): For all x; y 2 X,
xPy ) (x)  (y)
This is a very common axiom for the ranking of sets in many settings,
and it is also straightforwardly plausible in our context.
Responsiveness (RES): For all j; k 2 N such that j  k, and all ~a;~b 2
Qk such that ajPbj and ai = bi for all i 62 (f1; : : : ; kg n fjg),
~a  ~b
This condition is stronger than EXT. It implies that the substitution of
one outcome of an action with a better one results in a strict improvement.
This axiom is related to the Dominance properties in Kelsey's [17] vector-
based framework.
Independence (IND): For all k 2 N, all ~a;~b 2 Qk, all x 62 ~a [~b and all
m  (k + 1),
~a % ~b, Im(~a; x) % Im(~b; x)
Independence-like conditions are very common across most of the set-
ranking models, choice under complete uncertainty problems included (see
Kannai and Peleg [16] or Pattanaik and Peleg [21], among others). More
particularly, IND is a translation to our framework of Kelsey's [17] adapta-
tion of Savage's [22] Sure-Thing Principle. Axiom IND says that if we add
(remove) the same outcome to (from) the same position of two vectors, with-
out changing the likelihood ordering of the remaining elements, the original
evaluation remains invariant.
Neutrality (NEU): For all k 2 N, all ~a;~b 2 Qk and all one-to-one map-
ping f : X ! X such that for all x; y 2 (~a;~b), xRy , f(x)Rf(y),
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~a % ~b, (f(a1); : : : ; f(ak)) % (f(b1); : : : ; f(bk))
NEU is a direct adaptation of an axiom with the same name that appears
in Bossert [9], Nitzan and Pattanaik [20] and Pattanaik and Peleg [21], among
others, and is related to Kelsey's [17] Independence of Ranking of Irrelevant
Outcomes. According to NEU, the rule is immune to changes that do not
aect either the likelihood ordering of the outcomes within each action or the
desirability ordering of all the outcomes of the two actions to be compared.
Usually, this axiom is defended as a requirement that the labelling of the
outcomes should be irrelevant.
We are now going to introduce three axioms that state related ideas of
robustness of the strict preference between two situations when new outcomes
are added to them. These axioms are specic to this framework and have no
direct links with any of the axioms of the literature of choice under complete
uncertainty.
Likelihood sensitivity (LS): For all k 2 N, all ~a;~b 2 Qk such that
ai 6= bi for all i 2 f1; : : : ; kg, and all x 62 ~a, y 62 ~b, there exists ~c 2 Q such
that
~a  ~b) ((~a;~c); (x))  ((~b;~c); (y))
Consider an action ~a that is better than another action ~b and suppose
we add two new outcomes x and y to ~a and ~b respectively. The intuition
behind LS is that the preference between ~a and ~b is maintained if x and
y are added in a such a way as to be suciently unlikely. This is done by
inserting a certain set of outcomes, as large as necessary, between the original
sets and the new single outcomes. The real scope of the axiom arises when
yPx. Then, what the condition establishes is that, in order to maintain the
original preference for ~a versus ~b, we can compensate any big dierence in
desirability for y versus x by making them suciently unlikely.
The following two axioms are weaker versions of LS.
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Weak Likelihood sensitivity 1 (WLS1): For all k 2 N, all ~a;~b 2 Qk
such that ai 6= bi for all i 2 f1; : : : ; kg, and all x 62 ~a, y 62 ~b such that
maxf~a [~bgR maxfx; yg, there exists ~c 2 Q such that
~a  ~b) ((~a;~c); (x))  ((~b;~c); (y))
Weak Likelihood sensitivity 2 (WLS2): For all k 2 N, all ~a;~b 2 Qk
such that ai 6= bi for all i 2 f1; : : : ; kg, and all x 62 ~a, y 62 ~b such that
minfx; ygR minf~a [~bg, there exists ~c 2 Q such that
~a  ~b) ((~a;~c); (x))  ((~b;~c); (y))
Compared with LS, WLS1 and WLS2 state a similar idea, but the ax-
ioms are weaker because they apply to restricted domains of situations. In
particular, WLS1 (WLS2) requires that the new outcomes to be added, x
and y, are dierent and no better (worse) than the best (worst) outcome in
the original sets.
Finally, we propose two conditions that reect the idea that there always
exist outcomes that are suciently good or bad as to reverse a given prefer-
ence over two actions when added to one of them. These properties are also
specic to this framework.
High Outcome Sensitivity (HOS): For all k 2 N and all ~a;~b 2 Qk such
that there exists x 62 ~a [~b with xP maxf~a [~bg, there exists y 62 ~a [~b such
that
(a1; : : : ; ak 1; y)  ~b
Low Outcome Sensitivity (LOS): For all k 2 N and all ~a;~b 2 Qk such
that there exists x 62 ~a [~b such that minf~a [~bgPx, there exists y 62 ~a [~b
such that
~b  (a1; : : : ; ak 1; y)
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HOS (LOS) states that, when comparing two actions ~a and~b, there always
exists an outcome y, such that we can make ~a better (worse) than ~b by
substituing y for the least likely outcome in set ~a. The intuitive idea is that
we can always compensate the dierence in the preference between ~a and
~b with an outcome y provided it is suciently good (bad). Note that the
conditions only apply when there exists at least one outcome outside ~a and
~b that is better (worse) than all the outcomes inside.
Next, we are going to present some rules of comparison for the equal
cardinality case. For this we need to introduce an additional piece of notation.
For all ~a 2 Qk, (~a) will denote a permutation of the outcomes in ~a such
that i(~a)P i+1(~a) for all i < k, where i(~a) denotes the element of ~a that
occupies the i-th position after the permutation. That is,  reorders the
elements of ~a from best to worst, according to R. In the same way, we dene
(~a) as a permutation of the outcomes in ~a such that i+1(~a)P i(~a) for all
i < k, where i(~a) denotes the element of ~a that occupies the i-th position
after the permutation. Furthermore, L(i(~a)) will denote the position in
likelihood terms that element i(~a) occupies in ~a. That is, L(i(~a)) = k if
i(~a) = ak. In a similar way, we dene L(i(~a)) as the position in likelihood
terms that the i th worst outcome occupies in ~a.
Denition 4.1 A binary relation % Sk2N(QkQk) is the leximax-likelihood
rule %LL if for all ~a;~b 2 Qk for any k 2 N:
~a %LL ~b, ~a = ~b or there is j  k such that (ajPbj and ai = bi for all i < j):
Denition 4.2 A binary relation % Sk2N(QkQk) is the leximax-desirability
rule %LD if for all ~a;~b 2 Qk for any k 2 N:
~a %LD ~b, ~a = ~b or there is j  k such that:
for all i < j; i(~a) = i(~b) and L(i(~a)) = L(i(~b)) and
j(~a)Pj(~b) or  j(~a) = j(~b) and L(j(~a)) < L(j(~b)).
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Denition 4.3 A binary relation % Sk2N(QkQk) is the leximin-desirability
rule %ld if for all ~a;~b 2 Qk for any k 2 N:
~a %ld ~b, ~a = ~b or there is j  k such that:
for all i < j; i(~a) = i(~b) and L(i(~a)) = L(i(~b)) and
j(~a)Pj(~b) or  j(~a) = j(~b) and L(j(~a)) > L(j(~b)).
The three rules above are well-dened, complete and linear along Qk for
any k 2 N. Note that they are not dened for pairs of sets with dierent
cardinality.
The leximax-likelihood rule %LL proceeds as follows in order to compare
any two alternative actions: this rule rst looks at the most likely outcome
in each action. If one of them is strictly better than the other, then the
action with the better most likely outcome is declared strictly preferred. In
the event of a tie, the criterion looks at the second most likely outcomes in ~a
and ~b respectively and proceeds analogously. If ties occur successively until
both sets are exhausted, they are then declared indierent. This occurs only
when two actions are identical.
The leximax-desirability rule %LD starts by looking, respectively, at the
best outcome in each action. If there is a strict preference for one of the
outcomes over the other according to R, then the set that contains the for-
mer is declared strictly better. In the event of indierence between the two
outcomes, the rule proceeds to look at their positions in likelihood terms and
declares a strict preference in favour of the set where the best outcome is
most likely. Only in the event that the respective best outcomes occupy the
same position does the criterion proceed to look, respectively, at the second-
best outcome within each action and proceeds similarly. Note that, again,
indierence between two actions arises only when they are identical.
The leximin-desirability rule %ld is, in a sense, dual with respect to %LD.
The rule rst looks, respectively, at the worst element in each set. The set
where the worst element is better is declared preferred, and in the event of
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a tie, the rule selects the action where the worst element is less likely. If
both elements occupy the same position in their sets, then the rule looks at
the second-worst element in each set and proceeds lexicographically in an
analogous way.
The three rules above are related to other rules of a lexicographic nature
in Pattanaik and Peleg [21] within the set-based approach to the problems of
choice under complete uncertainty, and Kelsey [17] within the vector-based
approach to the problems of choice under partial uncertainty.
The following proposition shows that the three rules satisfy most of the
proposed axioms.
Proposition 4.1 The next statements hold:
1. The leximax-likelihood rule %LL satises EXT, RES, REO, IND, NEU,
COM, LS, WLS1 and WLS2, but neither HOS nor LOS.
2. The leximax-desirability rule %LD satises EXT, RES, REO, IND,
NEU, COM, WLS1 and HOS, but neither LOS, WLS2 nor LS.
3. The leximin-desirability rule %ld satises EXT, RES, REO, IND, NEU,
COM, WLS2 and LOS, but neither HOS, WLS1 nor LS.
(The proof is available upon request)
The results of Proposition 4.1 can be summarized in the following table:
Apart from the fact that the rules satisfy the axioms, we also have that
some combinations of such axioms are enough to characterize the rules. All
the proofs are shown in the Appendix.
Theorem 4.1 Let any reexive binary relation % Sk2N(Qk Qk). Then,
% satises EXT, IND and LS if and only if %=%LL.
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Table 1: Results of Proposition 4.1.
EXT RES REO IND NEU COM LS WLS1 WLS2 HOS LOS
%LL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N
%LD Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y N
%ld Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y
Note: Y indicates that the axiom is satised by the rule and N indicates that it is not satised.
Theorem 4.2 Let any preorder % Sk2N(QkQk). Then, % satises IND,
NEU, HOS and WLS1 if and only if %=%LD.
Theorem 4.3 Let any preorder % Sk2N(QkQk). Then, % satises IND,
NEU, LOS and WLS2 if and only if %=%ld.
As we saw in Table 1, axioms EXT, RES, REO, IND, NEU and COM
constitute the core of the conditions that are satised by all the proposed
rules. If one wants the rule to satisfy LS also, then the only possibility is the
leximax-likelihood ranking %LL (see Theorem 4.1). Otherwise, it is possible
to take weaker versions of LS (WLS1 or WLS2), and then, by imposing HOS
and LOS alternatively, we obtain rules that reect a stronger sensitivity to
the desirability of the outcomes (see Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3).
5 The general case
In the previous section, condition DOM, which applies to dierent cardinal-
ity comparisons, was dropped as a necessary condition. This opened the
way to obtain some positive results that will be put to use in this section
in order to explore an alternative way to overcome the initial impossibility
result produced by REO, DOM and COM. We now analyze the general case
without imposing any further axioms on the binary relation %. In turn, we
reintroduce DOM in the above characterizations, and a domain restriction of
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richness. As a consequence, we obtain some partial extensions of the above
criteria that x certain dierent cardinality comparisons. Another eect of
the generalization is that axiom COM, which was fullled for all the rules
in the equal cardinality case, will be satised only for equal-cardinality com-
parisons.
Denition 5.1 A preorder % Q  Q belongs to the family of extended
leximax-likelihood rules, %2%eLL, if for all ~a;~b 2 Q,
 If j~aj = j~bj, then ~a %LL ~b) ~a % ~b.
 If j~aj > j~bj, then f(a1; : : : ; aj~bj) LL ~b or [(a1; : : : ; aj~bj) LL ~b and ajPai
for all j > j~bj and i  j~bj]g ) ~a  ~b.
 If j~aj < j~bj, then f~a LL (b1; : : : ; bj~aj) or [~a LL (b1; : : : ; bj~aj) and biPbj
for all i  j~aj and j > j~aj]g ) ~a  ~b.
The extended leximax-likelihood rules collapse with the leximax-likelihood
rule when the actions to be compared have the same cardinality. Otherwise,
they proceed as follows: they select the rst outcomes of the set with greater
cardinality such as to form a subset with the same number of outcomes as
the smaller set. Then, the extended leximax-likelihood rules compare these
sets by the leximax-likelihood rule. If there is a strict preference, then they
replicate what the leximax-likelihood rule establishes. Otherwise, if the two
selected sets are identical, they look at the remaining (less likely) outcomes
of the larger set. If all of them are better than all the preceding outcomes,
then the larger set is declared preferred. If they are worse, the smaller set
is preferred. The remaining possible comparisons are not univocally deter-
mined, which is what distinguishes the dierent members of the family of
extended leximax-likelihood rules.
Denition 5.2 A preorder % Q  Q belongs to the family of extended
leximax-desirability rules, %2%eLD, if for all ~a;~b 2 Q,
 If j~aj = j~bj, then ~a %LD ~b) ~a % ~b.
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 If j~aj > j~bj, then [maxf~agP maxf~bg]) ~a  ~b.
 If j~aj < j~bj, ~a  ~b when there is no j  j~aj such that:
for all i < j, i(~b) = i(~a) and L(i(~b)) = L(i(~a)) and
j(~b)Pj(~a) or  j(~b) = j(~a) and L(j(~b)) < L(j(~a)).
The extended leximax-desirability rules coincide with the leximax-desirability
rule when the actions to be compared have the same cardinality. When the
cardinalities are dierent, then what every rule of the family has in common
is: a) that a preference for the larger set is established if its best outcome is
better than the best outcome of the smaller set. In other words, the intersec-
tion of all the rules of the family prioritizes the larger set only if it contains
the best of the outcomes among the two actions; b) that a preference for the
smaller set is established by means of the following procedure: if the best
element of the smaller set is better than the best element of the larger, then
the smaller set is declared preferred. If they are equal, then the smaller is
declared preferred if its best element is more likely. If the two are equal and
both occupy the same likelihood position, the same process is applied with
the respective second best elements. If this process exhausts the smaller set,
then the smaller set is declared preferred.
In all other cases, comparisons are not univocally determined by all the
members of the family.
As can be seen, when comparing actions with dierent cardinality, the
extended leximax-desirability rules do not treat them symmetrically. In or-
der to establish a preference for the smaller set, they follow a lexicographic
procedure parallel to the leximax-desirability rule. However, to ensure that
a strict preference for the larger set is declared by all the rules of the family,
the conditions are more demanding. The intuition behind this is that, when
the best outcomes of the larger and the smaller sets are indierent and in the
same likelihood position, this same likelihood position appear to have more
weight when the number of outcomes is smaller.
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Denition 5.3 A preorder % Q  Q belongs to the family of extended
leximin-desirability rules, %2%eld, if for all ~a;~b 2 Q,
 If j~aj = j~bj, then ~a %ld ~b) ~a % ~b.
 If j~aj > j~bj, ~a  ~b when there is no j  j~bj such that:
for all i < j, i(~b) = i(~a) and L(i(~b)) = L(i(~a)) and
j(~b)Pj(~a) or  j(~b) = j(~a) and L(j(~b)) > L(j(~a)).
 If j~aj < j~bj, then [minf~agP minf~bg]) ~a  ~b.
Again, the extended leximin-desirability rules coincide with the leximin-
desirability rule when the actions to be compared have the same cardinality.
Otherwise, they follow a comparison process that is dual to that of the ex-
tended leximax-desirability rules. In particular, a preference for the smaller
set is now established unanimously only if its worst outcome is better than
the worst outcome of the larger set. In turn, in order to ensure an unan-
imous preference for the larger set, the extended leximin-desirability rules
apply the leximin-desirability procedure analogously to the way in which ex-
tended leximax-desirability rules apply the leximax-desirability procedure to
establish a preference for a smaller set.
The above extensions can be identied by making use of the axiomatic
battery from Section 4 and the extra assumptions of richness of the domain
and DOM. We can also remove the necessary requirement of EXT in the rst
theorem, given that it is now implied by the remaining asssumptions.
Theorem 5.1
Let X be rich with respect to R. Then, a preorder % QQ satises IND,
LS and DOM if and only if %2%eLL.
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Theorem 5.2
Let X be rich with respect to R. Then, a preorder % QQ satises IND,
NEU, HOS, WLS1 and DOM if and only if %2%eLD.
Theorem 5.3
Let X be rich with respect to R. Then, a preorder % QQ satises IND,
NEU, LOS, WLS2 and DOM if and only if %2%eld.
One might think that the families described in Denitions 5:1, 5:2 and/or
5:3 are empty due to intransitivities and that, therefore, the corresponding
characterization theorems are, in fact, impossibility theorems. However, it
can be shown that there exist even linear orders within each of the families.
In the Appendix, we show an example of a linear order for each of the families.
Remark 5.1 Kannai and Peleg [16] proved the impossibility of combining
certain ideas of Dominance and Independence in the set-based approach to
choice under complete uncertainty (ranking sets of outcomes without any
likelihood information) when jXj  6. Also, Bossert [9] and Barbera et al.
[4] proved that, when adding Neutrality to such ideas of Dominance and In-
dependence, the impossibility stands for jXj  4. A remarkable feature of
Theorems 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 is that, if we admit ordinal likelihood information,
our proposed adaptations of the ideas of Dominance, Independence and Neu-
trality (axioms DOM, IND and NEU) become compatible, even in an innite
domain. One may conclude that it is the richness assumption that allows
this compatibility. However, it can be shown that even without such assump-
tion, rules can be found where the three axioms are compatible, though their
description is rather tedious.3
3Examples can be provided upon request.
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6 Conclusions and further research
We have proposed a new formal framework to analyze problems of choice
under uncertainty in plausible environments where the decision maker is
unable to establish a complete probability distribution among the outcomes
of each action, but is able to order them in terms of their likelihood. By
imposing three intuitive axioms (Reordering, Dominance and Composition),
we obtain that there is no preorder among actions that satises them all at
once, either in the innite case or in the nite one when jXj  3.
With respect to the axioms, Reordering only applies to comparisons of
equally-sized sets; Dominance only applies to comparisons of dierent-sized
sets; and Composition can apply in both cases. Taking into account this
and the fact that Composition might be arguable when actions of dierent
cardinality are involved, we analyze in Section 4 the equal-cardinality case
-implicitly renouncing Dominance. Then, by imposing other alternative ax-
ioms, we obtain axiomatic characterizations of dierent rules in this restricted
domain. All these rules satisfy Reordering and Composition. They compare
actions in a lexicographic way, maintaining the spirit of other lexicographic
rules proposed in the related literature. Taking the results of Section 4 as a
reference, we explore in Section 5 an alternative way to overcome the initial
impossibility result. Now, Dominance is added as a further condition to the
rules of Section 4 and, in turn, we renounce the need to fulll Composition
when comparing sets of dierent cardinality. The result is the characteri-
zation of three families that extend the rules presented in Section 4 to the
general case.
Regarding further research, it would be of interest to investigate whether
additional plausible conditions might constrain the families characterized in
Section 5. Another line of research that, from our point of view, would make
complete sense, would be to relax the linearity assumption about the likeli-
hood relation among the outcomes within each action. We believe that, from
a descriptive point of view, there are many situations where decision makers
consider certain pairs of possible outcomes within an action to be equally
likely. In our setting, this would mean that the likelihood relation among
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the outcomes should admit indierences. It seems that this would aect the
model in a nontrivial way, starting from the notational stage because actions
could then no longer be described as ordered sets.
As a matter of fact, from a bounded rationality-like perspective, it would
be reasonable to even further relax the structure of the binary likelihood
relation among the outcomes within each action. A very appealing research
exercise that occurs to us would be to analyze in our general framework the
consequences of assuming that the likelihood relation is, for example, just an
interval order, a semiorder, or a partial order.
Appendix
We show here the proofs of the theorems. We rst present four lemmas that
will be useful in the proofs of the results.
Lemma 6.1 Let % be a binary relation on Q. If % satises EXT and IND,
then it also satises RES.
Proof: Let % (QQ) satisfying EXT and IND, and let ~a;~b 2 Qk for any
k 2 N such that ajPbj and ai = bi for all i 6= j. We apply IND (k  1)-times
and we have that
~a % ~b, (aj) % (bj)
~b % ~a, (bj) % (aj)
By EXT, we have that (aj)  (bj). Consequently, ~a  ~b, and % satises
RES.

Lemma 6.2 Let % be a binary relation on Q. Then, the next statements
hold:
1. If % satises EXT, IND and WLS1, then it also satises REO.
2. If % satises EXT, IND and WLS2, then it also satises REO.
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Proof: We will prove both statements using the same reasoning. Let %
(Q  Q) satisfying EXT, IND and WLS1, and ~a 2 Qk for any k 2 N such
that ajPai. Note that (i;j)(~a) and ~a have all positions equal, except i and
j. Then, we apply IND (k   2)-times obtaining
~a % (i;j)(~a), (ai; aj) % (aj; ai)
(i;j)(~a) % ~a, (aj; ai) % (ai; aj)
Now, EXT ensures that (aj)  (ai). The application of WLS1 or WLS2
implies that there exists ~c 2 Q such that (((aj);~c); (ai))  (((ai);~c); (aj)).
Now, applying IND j~cj-times, obtaining that (aj; ai)  (ai; aj). Consequently,
(i;j)(~a)  ~a and % satises REO. 
Lemma 6.3 Let % be a binary relation on Q. Then, the next statements
hold:
1. If % satises HOS and NEU, then it also satises EXT.
2. If % satises LOS and NEU, then it also satises EXT.
Proof: We are going to prove only the rst case because the second is dual.
Let x; y 2 X such that xPy. We have by HOS that there exists an outcome
z 2 X such that zPy and (z)  (y). Then, applying NEU, we conclude that
(x)  (y). Therefore, % satises also EXT. 
Lemma 6.4 Let X be rich with respect to R and let % be a preorder on Q.
If % satises IND and DOM, then it also satises EXT.
Proof: Let x; y 2 X such that xPy. Then, by the richness assumption,
there exists z 2 X such that xPzPy. Then, by DOM, we have that (x; z) 
(z)  (y; z). By transitivity, (x; z)  (y; z), and applying IND, we obtain
(x)  (y). 
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Proof of Theorem 3.1
Let x; y; z 2 X such that xPyPz, and consider the set ~a = (x; z; y). Then, if
we apply the permutation (2;3) to ~a, we obtain the set (2;3)(~a) = (x; y; z).
Given that yPz, by REO we have that (x; y; z)  (x; z; y). Furthermore, by
DOM we can conclude that (x)  (x; y) and (z; y)  (z). Applying COM
we have that (x; z; y) % (x; y; z), and by transitivity, (x; y; z)  (x; y; z),
contradicting reexivity.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
The necessary part can be easily checked. To prove the sucient part, let
~a;~b 2 Qk. If ~a = ~b, we have by reexivity that ~a  ~b. If ~a 6= ~b, we
can assume by IND that ai 6= bi for all i  k. We will proceed by induc-
tion on k. Let us start with k = 1. Suppose, without loss of generality,
that a1Pb1. Then, by EXT we have that (a1)  (b1) and it is proved for
k = 1. Now, we will suppose that the statement is true for k = t and we
will prove the case k = t + 1. We have by the induction hypothesis that
(a1; : : : ; at)  (b1; : : : ; bt) when a1Pb1. Then, LS says that there exists ~c 2 Q
such that (((a1; : : : ; at);~c); (at+1))  (((b1; : : : ; bt);~c); (bt+1)). Applying IND
j~cj-times we obtain that (a1; : : : ; at+1)  (b1; : : : ; bt+1), proving the result.
Thus, %=%LL.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
The necessary part is straightforward. To prove the sucient part, let ~a;~b 2
Qk. First, we know by Lemma 6.3 that EXT is satised. If ~a = ~b, we have
by reexivity that ~a  ~b. If ~a 6= ~b, by IND we can assume that ai 6= bi for
all i  k. If k = 1, we can apply EXT and we have that a1Pb1 ) ~a  ~b. If
k > 1, we need to prove, without loss of generality, the following two cases:
1. maxf~agP maxf~bg. If L(1(~a)) = k, select x 62 ~a such that akPx, whose
existence is guaranteed. Then, we construct the set ~a0 = (a1; : : : ;
ak 1; x). Now, we can apply HOS to sets ~a0 and~b and we have that there
exists y 62 ~a0 such that (a1; : : : ; ak 1; y)  ~b. Now, if akPy, given the
result of Lemma 6.1, we can apply RES obtaining ~a  (a1; : : : ; ak 1; y).
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Transitivity concludes that ~a  ~b. If yPak, then, by NEU and transi-
tivity, ~a  ~b. If, on the other hand, L(1(~a)) < k, we have by Lemma
6.2 that REO can be applied obtaining ~a  (i;k)(~a). Now, applying
the previous reasoning to (i;k)(~a) and ~b, we have that (i;k)(~a)  ~b.
Transitivity concludes that ~a  ~b.
2. maxf~ag = maxf~bg, with L(1(~a)) = i < L(1(~b)). Consider the fol-
lowing sets: (a1; : : : ; ai); (b1; : : : ; bi) 2 Qi. Given that max is uniquely-
valued, we can apply Case 1 obtaining (a1; : : : ; ai)  (b1; : : : ; bi). We
know, by WLS1, that there exists ~c 2 Q such that (((a1; : : : ; ai);~c);
(ai+1))  (((b1; : : : ; bi);~c); (bi+1)). Then, applying IND j~cj-times, we
have that (a1; : : : ; ai; ai+1)  (b1; : : : ; bi; bi+1). Repeating this process
(k   i)-times, we obtain ~a  ~b.
Therefore, %=%LD.
Proof of Theorem 4.3
The necessary part is straightforward. To prove the sucient part, let ~a;~b 2
Qk. First, we know by Lemma 6.3 that EXT is satised. If ~a = ~b, we have
by reexivity that ~a  ~b. If ~a 6= ~b, by IND we can assume that ai 6= bi for
all i  k. If k = 1, we can apply EXT and we have that a1Pb1 ) ~a  ~b. If
k > 1, we need to prove, without loss of generality, the following cases:
1. minf~agP minf~bg. If L(1(~b)) = k, select x 62 ~b such that xPbk, whose
existence is guaranteed. Then, construct the set ~b0 = (b1; : : : ; bk 1; x).
Now, we can apply LOS to the sets ~a and ~b0 and we have that there
exists y 62 ~b0 such that ~a  (b1; : : : ; bk 1; y). Now, if yPbk, by Lemma
6.1 we can apply RES obtaining (b1; : : : ; bk 1; y)  ~b. Transitivity con-
cludes that ~a  ~b. If bkPy, then, by NEU and transitivity, ~a  ~b. If, on
the other hand, L(1(~b)) < k, we have by Lemma 6.2 that we can apply
REO, obtaining (i;k)(~b)  ~b. Now, applying the previous reasoning to
~a and (i;k)(~b), we have that ~a  (i;k)(~b), and by transitivity ~a  ~b.
2. minf~ag = minf~bg, with L(1(~a)) = i > L(1(~b)). Consider the fol-
lowing sets: (a1; : : : ; ai); (b1; : : : ; bi) 2 Qi. Given that min is uniquely-
valued, we can apply Case 1 to obtain (a1; : : : ; ai)  (b1; : : : ; bi). Now,
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we know, by WLS2, that there exists ~c 2 Q such that (((a1; : : : ; ai);~c);
(ai+1))  (((b1; : : : ; bi);~c); (bi+1)). Then, applying IND j~cj-times, we
have that (a1; : : : ; ai; ai+1)  (b1; : : : ; bi; bi+1). Repeating this process
(k   i)-times, we obtain ~a  ~b.
Therefore, %=%ld.
Proof of Theorem 5.1
Given Lemma 6.4, we have that EXT is satised. Then, we also have that
EXT, IND and LS imply the desired result for all comparisons when the sets
are of the same cardinality (see Theorem 4.1). For the remaining compar-
isons, let ~a 2 Qk and ~b 2 Qm, with k < m. We have to prove the following
cases:
1. ~a LL (b1; : : : ; bk). Then, by the richness of the domain, we can se-
lect x1; : : : ; xm k 2 X such that minf~agP maxfx1; : : : ; xm kg. We
can apply DOM succesively in the appropriate order, obtaining ~a 
(a1; : : : ; ak; x1; : : : ; xm k). Now, by the result of Theorem 4.1, we have
that (a1; : : : ; ak; x1; : : : ; xm k)  ~b. Transitivity concludes that ~a  ~b.
2. (b1; : : : ; bk) LL ~a. Then, by the richness assumption we can select
y1; : : : ; ym k 2 X such that minfy1; : : : ; ym kgP maxf~ag. Applying
DOM succesively in the appropriate order, we obtain (a1; : : : ; ak; y1;
: : : ; ym k)  ~a. Now, by the result of Theorem 4.1, we have that
~b  (a1; : : : ; ak; y1; : : : ; ym k). Transitivity concludes that ~b  ~a.
3. (b1; : : : ; bk) LL ~a and biP maxf~ag for all i > k. By Theorem 4.1, we
have that (b1; : : : ; bk)  ~a. We apply DOM in the appropriate order to
obtain ~b  (b1; : : : ; bk), and by transitivity, ~b  ~a.
4. (b1; : : : ; bk) LL ~a and minf~agPbi for all i > k. By Theorem 4.1, we
have that (b1; : : : ; bk)  ~a. Now, applying DOM in the appropriate
order, we obtain (b1; : : : ; bk)  ~b, and by transitivity, ~a  ~b.
5. It is not dicult to check that the remaining comparisons are not uni-
vocally determined by our axioms.
Therefore, %2%eLL.
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Proof of Theorem 5.2
We have that IND, NEU, HOS and WLS1 implies the result for the compar-
isons of sets with the same cardinality (see Theorem 4.2). For the remaining
comparisons, let ~a 2 Qk and ~b 2 Qm, with k < m. We have to prove the
following cases:
1. maxf~bgP maxf~ag. Then, making use of the richness assumption, take
x1; : : : ; xm k 2 X such that maxf~bgPxiP maxf~ag for all i 2 f1; : : : ;
m  kg. Applying DOM succesively in the appropiate order, we obtain
(a1; : : : ; ak; x1; : : : ; xm k)  ~a. Now, by the result of Theorem 4.2, we
have that ~b  (a1; : : : ; ak; x1; : : : ; xm k), and by transitivity, ~b  ~a.
2. there is no j  j~aj such that for all i < j, i(~b) = i(~a) and L(i(~b)) =
L(i(~a)) and j(~b)Pj(~a) or  j(~b) = j(~a) and L(j(~b)) < L(j(~a)).
In this case, we divide the proof into the following two cases:
 ~a 6= (b1; : : : ; bk). Then, by the richness assumption, consider
x1; : : : ; xm k 2 X such that minf~agP maxfx1; : : : ; xm kg. Then,
applying DOM succesively in the correct order, we have that ~a 
(a1; : : : ; ak; x1; : : : ; xm k). Note that (a1; : : : ; ak; x1; : : : ; xm k) and
~b have the same cardinality and, therefore, Theorem 4.2 can be
applied obtaining (a1; : : : ; ak; x1; : : : ; xm k)  ~b. Transitivity con-
cludes that ~a  ~b.
 ~a = (b1; : : : ; bk). Then, consider y1; : : : ; ym k 2 X such that
minf~agPyiP maxfbk+1; : : : ; bmg for all i 2 f1; : : : ;m   kg. Then,
applying DOM succesively in the appropiate order, we have that
~a  (a1; : : : ; ak; y1; : : : ; ym k). Then, by Theorem 4.2 we obtain
that (a1; : : : ; ak; y1; : : : ; ym k)  ~b and, by transitivity, ~a  ~b.
3. It is not dicult to check that the remaining comparisons are not uni-
vocally determined by our axioms.
Therefore, %2%eLD
28
Proof of Theorem 5.3
We have that IND, NEU, LOS and WLS2 implies the result for the compar-
isons of sets with the same cardinality (see Theorem 4.3). For the remaining
comparisons, let ~a 2 Qk and ~b 2 Qm, with k < m. We have to prove the
following cases:
1. minf~agP minf~bg. Then, by the richness assumption, we can select
x1; : : : ; xm k 2 X such that minf~agPxiP minf~bg for all i 2 f1; : : : ;m 
kg. By DOM, we have that ~a  (a1; : : : ; ak; x1; : : : ; xm k). Now, by
the result of Theorem 4.3, we have that (a1; : : : ; ak; x1; : : : ; xm k)  ~b.
Transitivity concludes that ~a  ~b.
2. there is no j  j~bj such that for all i < j, i(~b) = i(~a) and L(i(~b)) =
L(i(~a)) and j(~b)Pj(~a) or  j(~b) = j(~a) and L(j(~b)) > L(j(~a)).
In this case, consider the following two situations:
 ~a 6= (bm k+1; : : : ; bm). Then, by the richnesss assumption, con-
sider x1; : : : ; xm k 2 X such that minfx1; : : : ; xm kgP maxf~ag.
Then, applying DOM succesively in the appropiate order, we ob-
tain (x1; : : : ; xm k; a1; : : : ; ak)  ~a. Note that (x1; : : : ; xm k; a1;
: : : ; ak) and ~b have the same cardinality and therefore Theorem
4.3 can be applied obtaining ~b  (x1; : : : ; xm k; a1; : : : ; ak). Tran-
sitivity concludes that ~b  ~a.
 ~a = (bm k+1; : : : ; bm). Then, by the richnesss assumption, con-
sider y1; : : : ; ym k 2 X such that minfb1; : : : ; bm kgPyiP maxf~ag
for all i 2 f1; : : : ;m   kg. Succesive applications of DOM in the
appropiate order implies that (y1; : : : ; ym k; a1; : : : ; ak)  ~a. The-
orem 4.3 implies that ~b  (y1; : : : ; ym k; a1; : : : ; ak). Transitivity
concludes that ~b  ~a.
3. It is not dicult to check that the remaining comparisons are not uni-
vocally determined by our axioms.
Therefore, %2%eld
29
Example of linear orders in the extended families
We provide three linear orders that belong to each of the extended families
(%eLL, %eLD and %eld, respectively).
 %eLL: Consider %12%eLL, which compares any two actions ~a;~b 2 Q as
follows:
{ If j~aj = j~bj, then ~a %LL ~b) ~a %1 ~b.
{ If j~aj > j~bj, then ~a 1 ~b , f(a1; : : : ; aj~bj) LL ~b or [(a1; : : : ; aj~bj)
LL ~b and aj~bj+1P maxf~bg]g
and
~b 1 ~a, f~b LL (a1; : : : ; aj~bj) or [~b LL (a1; : : : ; aj~bj) and maxf~bg
Paj~bj+1]g.
 %eLD: Consider %22%eLD, which compares any two actions ~a;~b 2 Q as
follows:
{ If j~aj = j~bj, then ~a %LD ~b) ~a %2 ~b.
{ If j~aj > j~bj, then ~a 2 ~b, there is j  j~bj such that:
for all i < j; i(~a) = i(~b) and L(i(~a)) = L(i(~b)) and
j(~a)Pj(~b) or  j(~a) = j(~b) and L(j(~a)) < L(j(~b))
and
~b 2 ~a, there is no j  j~bj such that:
for all i < j; i(~a) = i(~b) and L(i(~a)) = L(i(~b)) and
j(~a)Pj(~b) or  j(~a) = j(~b) and L(j(~a)) < L(j(~b)).
 %eld: Consider %32%eld, which compares any two actions ~a;~b 2 Q as
follows:
{ If j~aj = j~bj, then ~a %ld ~b) ~a %3 ~b.
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{ If j~aj > j~bj, then ~a 3 ~b, there is no j  j~bj such that:
for all i < j, i(~b) = i(~a) and L(i(~b)) = L(i(~a)) and
j(~b)Pj(~a) or  j(~b) = j(~a) and L(j(~b)) > L(j(~a)).
and
~b 3 ~a, there is j  j~bj such that:
for all i < j, i(~b) = i(~a) and L(i(~b)) = L(i(~a)) and
j(~b)Pj(~a) or  j(~b) = j(~a) and L(j(~b)) > L(j(~a)).
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